SDN Security: A Survey by Scott-Hayward, Sandra et al.
SDN Security: A Survey
Scott-Hayward, S., O'Callaghan, G., & Sezer, S. (2013). SDN Security: A Survey. In 2013 IEEE SDN for Future
Networks and Services (SDN4FNS). (pp. 1-7). Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE). DOI:
10.1109/SDN4FNS.2013.6702553
Published in:
2013 IEEE SDN for Future Networks and Services (SDN4FNS)
Document Version:
Peer reviewed version
Queen's University Belfast - Research Portal:
Link to publication record in Queen's University Belfast Research Portal
Publisher rights
© 2013 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE must be obtained for all other uses, in any current or future
media, including
reprinting/republishing this material for advertising or promotional purposes, creating new
collective works, for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted
component of this work in other works.
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Queen's University Belfast Research Portal is retained by the author(s) and / or other
copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated
with these rights.
Take down policy
The Research Portal is Queen's institutional repository that provides access to Queen's research output. Every effort has been made to
ensure that content in the Research Portal does not infringe any person's rights, or applicable UK laws. If you discover content in the
Research Portal that you believe breaches copyright or violates any law, please contact openaccess@qub.ac.uk.
Download date:15. Feb. 2017
Queen's University Belfast - Research Portal
SDN Security: A Survey
Scott-Hayward, S., O'Callaghan, G., & Sezer, S. (2013). SDN Security: A Survey. 56-62. Paper presented at
IEEE SDN for Future Networks and Services (SDN4FNS), Trento, Italy.10.1109/SDN4FNS.2013.6702553
Document Version:
Author final version (often known as postprint)
Link:




Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Queen's University Belfast Research Portal is retained by the author(s) and / or other
copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated
with these rights.
Take down policy
The Research Portal is Queen's institutional repository that provides access to Queen's research output. Every effort has been made to
ensure that content in the Research Portal does not infringe any person's rights, or applicable UK laws. If you discover content in the
Research Portal that you believe breaches copyright or violates any law, please contact openaccess@qub.ac.uk.
Download date:30. Jul. 2015
SDN Security: A Survey
Sandra Scott-Hayward, Gemma O’Callaghan and Sakir Sezer
Centre for Secure Information Technolocy (CSIT)
Queen’s University Belfast
Belfast, BT3 9DT, Northern Ireland
ABSTRACT—The pull of Software-Defined Networking
(SDN) is magnetic. There are few in the networking
community who have escaped its impact. As the benefits of
network visibility and network device programmability are
discussed, the question could be asked as to who exactly will
benefit? Will it be the network operator or will it, in fact,
be the network intruder? As SDN devices and systems hit
the market, security in SDN must be raised on the agenda.
This paper presents a comprehensive survey of the research
relating to security in software-defined networking that has
been carried out to date. Both the security enhancements to
be derived from using the SDN framework and the security
challenges introduced by the framework are discussed. By
categorizing the existing work, a set of conclusions and
proposals for future research directions are presented.
I. INTRODUCTION
Software-defined networking (SDN) is rapidly moving
from vision to reality with a host of SDN-enabled
devices in development and production. The combination
of separated control and data plane functionality and
programmability in the network, which have long been
discussed in the research world, have found their com-
mercial application in cloud computing and virtualization
technologies.
The advantages of SDN in various scenarios (e.g. the
enterprise, the datacenter etc.) and across various back-
bone networks have already been proven e.g. Google
B4 [1]. However, challenges exist for a full-scale carrier
network implementation of SDN. A number of these
challenges have been presented in [2]. One key area,
which is only beginning to receive the attention it
deserves, is that of security in SDN.
The SDN architecture can be exploited to enhance
network security with the provision of a highly reactive
security monitoring, analysis and response system. The
central controller is key to this system. Traffic analysis
or anomaly-detection methods deployed in the network
generate security-related data, which can be regularly
transferred to the central controller. Applications can
be run at the controller to analyze and correlate this
feedback from the complete network. Based on the
analysis, new or updated security policy can be prop-
agated across the network in the form of flow rules.
This consolidated approach can efficiently speed up the
control and containment of network security threats.
However, the same attributes of centralized control
and programmability associated with the SDN platform
introduce network security challenges. An increased
potential for Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks due to
the centralized controller and flow-table limitation in
network devices is a prime example. Another issue of
concern based on open programmability of the network
is trust; both between applications and controllers, and
controllers and network devices.
A number of solutions to these SDN security chal-
lenges have been proposed in the literature. These range
from controller replication schemes through policy con-
flict resolution to authentication mechanisms. Similarly,
a number of proposals have been made to exploit the
SDN framework for enhanced network security.
An analysis of the security challenges of SDN is
presented in this paper. The individual security issues
are categorized according to the SDN layer affected
or targeted. The proposed and emerging solutions to
these challenges are then discussed and categorized. The
requirement for further work to establish a secure and
robust SDN is clearly identified from the gap between
the issues and the existing research. Without a significant
increase in focus on security, it will not be possible for
SDN to support the evolving capability associated with,
for example, Network Functions Virtualization (NFV)
[3].
II. SECURITY ANALYSES OF SDN
The basic properties of a secure communications
network are: confidentiality, integrity, availability of in-
formation, authentication and non-repudiation [4]. In
order to provide a network protected from malicious
attack or unintentional damage, security professionals
must secure the data, the network assets (e.g. devices)
and the communication transactions across the network.
The alterations to the network architecture introduced by
SDN must be assessed to ensure that network security
is sustained.
In an early iteration of what is known today as SDN,
Casado et al. [5] specifically considered the security
aspects of a separate control and forwarding framework.
Their SANE architecture, proposed in 2006, centred on
a logically centralized controller responsible for authen-
tication of hosts and policy enforcement. At the time
of its proposal, this was considered to be an extreme
approach that would require a radical change to the
networking infrastructure and end-hosts, which could be
too restrictive for some enterprises.
Ethane [6] extended the work of SANE but used an
approach, which required less alteration to the original
network. It controlled the network through the use of two
components; a centralized controller responsible for en-
forcing global policy, and ethane switches, which simply
forwarded packets based on rules in a flow table. This
simplified network control allowed the data and control
plane to be separated to allow for more programmability.
Although the Ethane architecture gave us a closer look
at what SDN and OpenFlow would become, it suffered
from a number of drawbacks. One of these is the fact
that application traffic could compromise network policy.
In today’s SDN architecture, applications are used to
provide various services, as, for example, with Network
Functions Virtualization (NFV). The compromise of
applications could potentially breach the entire network.
Considering the specific issues with security in SDN
from the perspective of the SDN framework (Fig. 1), we
can identify challenges associated with each layer of the
framework: application, control and data planes, and on
the interfaces between these layers.
Fig. 1. SDN Functional Architecture illustrating the data, control and
application layers and interfaces
A number of security analyses have recently been
performed, which have found that the altered elements
or relationship between elements in the SDN framework
introduce new vulnerabilities, which were not present
before SDN. One such paper [7] completes an analysis of
the OpenFlow protocol using the STRIDE threat analysis
methodology [8]. This paper focuses on the execution
of Information Disclosure and DoS attacks, which the
author established were possible to successfully execute.
Although a number of mitigation techniques are pro-
posed, these techniques are not proven in the work.
The OpenFlow switch specification [9] describes the
use of transport layer security (TLS) with mutual au-
thentication between the controllers and their switches.
However, the security feature is optional, and the stan-
dard of TLS is not specified. The lack of TLS adoption
by major vendors and the possibility of DoS attacks are
the focus of an OpenFlow vulnerability assessment [10].
The authors found that the lack of TLS use could lead
to fraudulent rule insertion and rule modification.
In [11] Kreutz et al. present a high-level analysis
of the overall security of SDN. They conclude that
due to the nature of the centralized controller and the
programmability of the network, new threats are intro-
duced requiring new responses. They propose a number
of techniques in order to address the various threats,
including replication, diversity and secure components.
Finally, the research network and testbed, ProtoGENI,
has also been analyzed [12]. The authors discovered that
numerous attacks between users of the testbed along
with malicious propagation and flooding attacks to the
wider internet were possible when using the ProtoGENI
network.
The results of these analyses indicate the range of
the security issues associated with the SDN framework.
In Table I, a categorization of the SDN security issues
is presented. A connection is drawn between the type
of issue/attack (e.g. unauthorized access) and the SDN
layer/interface affected by the issue/attack.
The control and data layers are identified in Table I as
clear targets of attack. This reflects the main distinctions
between the traditional network and the SDN; that of
the centralized control element and the altered datapath
elements to support programmability.
Although this analysis points towards security issues
related to the control and data layers, there has been
limited research in the field to tackle the challenges. In
fact, as detailed in the next section, greater attention has
been given to exploring the potential improvements in
network security to be derived from the SDN framework.
III. SECURITY ENHANCEMENT USING SDN
The architecture of a software-defined network intro-
duces potential for innovation in the use of the network.
The combination of the global or network-wide view
and the network programmability supports a process of
harvesting intelligence from existing Intrusion Detection
Systems (IDS) and Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS),
for example, followed by analysis and centralized re-
programming of the network. This approach can render
the SDN more robust to malicious attack than traditional
networks.
TABLE I
CATEGORIZATION OF THE SECURITY ISSUES ASSOCIATED WITH THE SDN FRAMEWORK BY LAYER/INTERFACE AFFECTED
SDN Layer Affected or Targeted
Security Issue/Attack Application App-Ctl Control Ctl-Data Data
Layer Interface Layer Interface Layer
Unauthorized Access e.g.
Unauthorized Controller Access X X X
Unauthenticated Application X X X
Data Leakage e.g.
Flow Rule Discovery (Side Channel Attack on Input Buffer) X
Forwarding Policy Discovery (Packet Processing Timing Analysis) X
Data Modification e.g.
Flow Rule Modification to Modify Packets X X X
Malicious Applications e.g.
Fraudulent Rule Insertion X X X
Controller Hijacking X X X
Denial of Service e.g.
Controller-Switch Communication Flood X X X
Switch Flow Table Flooding X
Configuration Issues e.g.
Lack of TLS (or other Authentication Technique) Adoption X X X
Policy Enforcement X X X
A. The SDN Middle-box
Traditional networks use middle-boxes to provide
network security functions. Recently, there has been
discussion about the integration of security middle-boxes
into SDN exploiting the benefit of programmability to
redirect selected network traffic through the middle-
box. For example, the Slick architecture [13] proposes a
centralized controller, which is responsible for installing
and migrating functions onto custom middle-boxes. Ap-
plications can then direct the Slick controller to install
the necessary functions for routing particular flows based
on security requirements.
The FlowTags architecture [14] proposes the use of
minimally modified middle-boxes, which interact with
a SDN controller through a FlowTags Application Pro-
gramming Interface (API). FlowTags, consisting of traf-
fic flow information, are embedded in packet headers to
provide flow tracking and enable controlled routing of
tagged packets. A clear disadvantage of this architecture
is the fact that it works with only pre-defined policies
and currently does not handle dynamic actions.
The SIMPLE policy enforcement layer [15] is an
approach for using SDN to manage middlebox deploy-
ments. In contrast to [13], [14], it requires no modifi-
cations to SDN capabilities or middle-box functionality,
which makes it suitable for legacy systems.
Based on these proposals, it would appear that a sim-
ple approach to network security provision would be to
introduce an appropriate middle-box and programme the
network to direct selected traffic through the middle-box.
It is not, however, quite as straightforward as that. The
appropriate placement and integration of SDN middle-
boxes must be determined along with the performance
penalty that can be tolerated when traffic is diverted
through an additional link. Such questions have not yet
been resolved.
However, as illustrated in Table I, the range of attacks
that pose threats to the network is well understood.
As such, beyond middle-boxes, a series of solutions
have been proposed, which specifically exploit the SDN
framework to provide network security solutions.
B. SDN = “Security Defined Networking”?
Attackers use various scanning techniques to discover
vulnerable targets in the network. One defense presented
to thwart these attacks is the use of random virtual
Internet Protocol (IP) addresses using SDN [16]. This
technique uses the OpenFlow controller to manage a
pool of virtual IP addresses, which are assigned to hosts
within the network, hiding the real IP addresses from
the outside world. This presents moving target defense,
which is a form of adaptive cybersecurity.
Monitoring Systems are essential in protecting the
network from attack. In [17], the authors present a
Distributed DoS (DDoS) detection method based on
several traffic flow features. This system monitors NOX
(C++ based OpenFlow Controller) switches at regular
intervals and uses Self Organizing Maps to identify
abnormal flows. In another approach, OpenSAFE [18]
uses its ALARMS policy language to manage the routing
of traffic through network monitoring devices. A similar
idea focusing on SDN in the cloud was presented by
Shin and Gu in [19]. CloudWatcher controls network
flows to guarantee that all necessary network packets
are inspected by some security devices. This framework
automatically detours network packets to be inspected
by pre-installed network security devices.
These solutions are based on a centralized network
management scheme; however other work encourages
the delegation of some control back to network devices
and hosts. Resonance, for example, [20], provides dy-
namic access control enforced by network devices them-
selves based on higher-level security policies. Naous et
al. [21] put forward the ident++ protocol to query end-
hosts and users for additional information in order to
make forwarding decisions; their argument being that
the central controller could become a bottleneck. While
retaining the programmability characteristic of SDN,
these methods propose to involve the network devices
in the control of the network, rather than relying on a
single, centralized controller.
One specific form of monitoring system, the IDS, has
been the focus of a number of SDN solutions. Skowyra
et al. [22] propose a learning IDS, which utilizes the
SDN architecture to both detect and respond to net-
work attacks in embedded mobile devices. A hardware-
accelerated NIDS (Network IDS) or NIPS (Network
IPS) scheme, as described in [23], allows the network
administrator to configure string patterns for use by a
deep packet inspection (DPI) module. Finally, the value
of using SDN to provide intrusion detection in a Home
Office/Small Office environment is proposed in [24].
The possibility for improving and simplifying network
security by means of the SDN architecture is evident
from this body of research. This potential has also been
recognised commercially with a range of SDN security
products at various stages of development.
IV. SECURITY CHALLENGES WITH SDN
While security as an advantage of the SDN framework
has been recognized, solutions to tackle the challenges
of securing the SDN network are fewer in number.
SDNs provide us with the ability to easily program
the network and to allow for the creation of dynamic
flow policies. It is, in fact, this advantage that may
also lead to security vulnerabilities. Within this dynamic
environment, it is vital that network security policy is
enforced. Model-checking becomes an important step
in detecting inconsistencies in policies from multiple
applications or installed across multiple devices. Model
checking combined with symbolic execution may be
used to test OpenFlow applications for correctness [25].
Binary Decision Diagrams can also be used to test
for intra-switch misconfigurations within a single flow
table [26]. FlowChecker exploits FlowVisor [27], which
enables isolation by partitioning the network resources
into slices. Son et al. propose Flover [28], which uses
assertion sets and modulo theories to verify flow policies,
while VeriFlow [29] studies the verification of invariants
in real-time. An additional layer, which sits between the
SDN controller and the network devices, intercepts flow
rules before they reach the network. Although VeriFlow
boasts low-latency of the checking process, it cannot
handle multiple controllers. In [30], the authors propose
the use of language-based security to enable flow-based
policy enforcement along with network isolation. This
solution is implemented as a NOX application and al-
lows the integration of external authentication sources to
provide access control. More recently, Splendid Isolation
[31] has been proposed as a means of verifying the
isolation of program traffic. This programming model
supports the idea of network slices to provide the funda-
mental security concepts of confidentiality and integrity.
There is a clear emphasis from the research community
on this issue of policy conflict resolution.
However, proposals to aid in the design of secure
SDNs are limited. Fresco [32] is one notable contri-
bution; which presents an OpenFlow Security Appli-
cation Development Framework incorporating FortNox
[33]; a security enforcement kernel. The idea behind
FRESCO is to allow the rapid design and development
of security specific modules, which can be incorporated
as an OpenFlow application. Porras et al. provide a
library of reusable modules which can be used for
the detection and mitigation of network threats. This
system incorporates the FortNox enforcement engine,
which handles possible conflicts with rule insertion. If
a rule conflict arises as a result of a new OpenFlow
rule enabling or disabling a prohibited/allowed existing
rule, then the new rule is accepted or rejected depending
on the level of security authorization of the author to
the existing conflicting rule provider. Although FortNox
provides numerous components, which are necessary for
enforcing security, the authors feel that much work is still
needed to offer a comprehensive suite of applications.
Moving from the design space to implementation, one
of the key industry concerns with security in SDN is
satisfaction of the audit process. For network compliance
and operation, a controlled inventory of network devices
is required. This involves knowledge of what devices
TABLE II
CATEGORIZATION OF THE RESEARCH ON SECURITY IN SDN
Research Security OpenFlow SDN Layer/Interface
Work Analysis Enhancement Solution App App-Ctl Ctl Ctl-Data Data
[7], [10], [12] X X X X X
[11] X X X X X
[5] X X X
[13], [14], [21] X X X X X X X
[15] X X X X
[16] X X X X X
[17], [24] X X X X X
[18], [19] X X X X X X
[20], [22] X X X X X X
[23] X X X
[25] X X X X X
[26], [28]–[30], [32] X X X X X X
[31] X X X
[33], [34] X X X X X
[35] X X X X
are running, how they are bound to the network etc.
This directly concerns the potential for virtualization
of network elements and functions as supported by
the SDN framework. Although there is an unresolved
challenge regarding the feasibility of mapping network
state across mobile and virtual functions, some related
work regarding network verification is worth mentioning.
In [34], the authors consider the problem of scalability
and security of OpenFlow networks and their use in
the cyber-physical space. Verificare allows for specifi-
cation modeling and verification of network correctness,
convergence and mobility-related properties. Hadigol et
al. propose the use of a prototype network debugger
[35], which could be used to allow SDN developers to
reconstruct the chain of events which lead to a bug and
identify its root cause.
As identified in Section II, the SDN architecture can
be considered as a set of layers and interfaces. The
layer/interface affected by some of the SDN-specific
security issues was identified in Table I. In a similar
manner, the SDN security research work is classified
in Table II by the layer/interface, which the analysis,
enhancement or solution targets. The results of this
categorization are discussed in the next section. It can
be noted that SANE [5] is included in Table II for
categorization with respect to affected layers/interfaces.
However, as a separate architecture, it is not identified
as an SDN security enhancement or solution.
V. DISCUSSION
Considering the categorization of research work in
Table II, it can be seen that there has been greater
focus on exploiting SDN for enhanced network security
than on generating solutions to the identifed security
issues. The enhancement work has centred on the use
of middle-boxes and monitoring systems for security
service insertion to dynamically detect and/or prevent
suspicious traffic during live network operation.
There is further potential in this area to exploit the
dynamic and adaptive capabilities of the SDN framework
using methods of moving target defense. The work pre-
sented in [16] is one such example where randomizing
the virtual IP addresses makes it more difficult for an
attacker to breach the network. Without a fixed system to
observe and prepare to attack, the strength of the attacker
is reduced.
New methods and techniques must be explored to
expand on the programmability of the network enabling
dynamic adjustments in security monitoring, detection
and prevention capabilities.
A minor observation from the content of Table II
is that the majority of the work references or im-
plements OpenFlow for the control-data interface. Al-
though any alternative to OpenFlow would have sim-
ilar attributes, it is worth noting that OpenFlow may
not be the only/definitive control-data interface protocol
in SDNs. For example, several Internet Engineering
Task Force (IETF) groups have defined protocols re-
garding separation of forwarding and control planes,
network configuration and routing. These include IETF
ForCES (Forwarding and Control Element Separation),
PCE (Path Computation Element), Netconf (Network
Configuration), LISP (Locator/ID Separation Protocol)
and I2RS (Interface to the Routing System). In addition,
proprietary protocols are being developed by individual
companies. The work to identify and correct security-
related limitations of the OpenFlow protocol should be
considered in the design and development of alternative
protocols. This could apply both to the control-data plane
interface and also to the higher-level abstractions at the
application-control interface, which may present similar
concerns.
The most significant element to highlight from the
categorization of security-related SDN research is that
there is an identifiable disconnect between the security
analyses presented to date, which focus on the control-
data plane issues, and the solutions to security issues,
the majority of which focus on one application-control
plane issue; that of policy conflict resolution.
Considering the breadth of potential security issues
outlined in Table I, it is clear that a significant increase in
effort is required to identify solutions to these challenges.
This requirement has been recognised in the past
year in some areas of the networking community. Since
the beginning of 2013, various working groups have
been established in both the standardization industry
and industry research groups. In the Open Network-
ing Foundation (ONF) and the European Telecommu-
nications Standards Institute (ETSI), groups focussed
specifically on security in SDN and NFV, respectively,
have been launched. In the Internet Research Task Force
(IRTF) and the International Telecommunication Union
- Telecommunication Standardization Sector (ITU-T),
general SDN study groups have been launched in which
security in SDN is an identified issue.
One of the recurring themes from these industry
working groups is the importance of designing security
in from the start. By this, it is meant that while SDN is in
the early stages of development, the associated security
issues should be identified and resolved. However, SDN-
compliant hardware, software and services are already in
production and in service. While some of these solutions
are, in fact, SDN security products, many others have
been developed with little or no consideration of the
security implications of a wide area network deployment.
It is, therefore, essential, that techniques, methods and
policies to overcome the SDN security challenges are
explored and defined to enable robust and reliable wide
area SDN deployments. An increased emphasis on this
now could avoid a reduction in the performance and
capability of future SDNs as a result of retrofit security
solutions.
VI. CONCLUSION
There are two schools of thought on security in
software-defined networking. The first is that signifi-
cant improvements in network security can be achieved
by simultaneously exploiting the programmability and
the centralized network view introduced by SDN. The
second is that these same two SDN attributes expose
the network to a range of new attacks. In this article,
we have categorized the SDN security challenges and
presented a comprehensive review of the research work
on security in SDN to date. Our analysis identifies that
regardless of your school of thought, there is yet more to
be done; more untapped potential and more unresolved
challenges. A concerted effort in both directions could
yield a truly secure and reliable Software-Defined Net-
work.
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